FAQ: Objections & Clarifications

Objections & Clarifications

This page clarifies the most common misunderstandings about the Left-Female Equivalence, or LFE.

I. What the LFE claims
II. Why not simply say that female interests influence leftism?
III. Why speak of “leftism”?
IV. Is a predominantly female domain automatically leftist?
V. Is the LFE just the voting gender gap?
VI. Is the Left-Female Equivalence a circular theory?
VII. What would weaken the LFE?
VIII. Do rightisms coincide with anti-leftism?

I. What the LFE claims

The Left-Female Equivalence claims the existence of a structural equivalence:

Leftism is the political expression of natural female interests and behaviours.

Natural female interests and behaviours are the individual expression of leftism.

Informally, this means that leftism = female preferences. What the LFE claims is therefore the existence of an equivalence between two levels of expression: the individual level, on the one hand, where female preferences manifest themselves through specific behaviours, tastes, sensibilities, modes of consumption, and forms of sociability; and the societal level, on the other hand, where leftism is embodied through laws (or their convenient absence), markets and cultural norms.

The LFE also claims that rich, free, and safe societies converge toward the same limit-leftism. This is the leftward drift, whose limit is neither marxism, nor radical feminism, nor radical ecology, nor some woke ideal. It resembles instead the continuation of contemporary socio-liberal societies: bureaucratic, consumerist, selectively ecological, hostile to certain masculine preferences, and highly protective of female interests.

It is this limit that the LFE calls leftism.

II. Why not simply say that female interests influence leftism?

Because this claim is too weak.

To say that female interests influence leftism would be to make them one factor among others, on the same level as economic, religious, or national interests. The LFE claims much more: in an ideally leftized society, there is a perfect correspondence between female preferences and leftism.

Thus, if women prefer cats to dogs, leftism should do the same, by treating cats with more indulgence than dogs: fewer taxes, fewer constraints, less punitive environmentalism.

Conversely, if leftism grants more empathy to suffering people than to accomplished people, the LFE invites us to look for a corresponding female trait. In this case, a tendency to value suffering for its own sake rather than for the reaction to it.

III. Why speak of “leftism”?

Very concretely, because representatives of social liberalism and progressivism themselves adopt this label. This is the case, for example, of Emmanuel Macron, Justin Trudeau, Barack Obama, or Sanna Marin: all come from left-wing parties, or still identify with that political family. The use of the term “leftism” therefore merely acknowledges this identification.

This terminology is however justified by deeper reasons. In modern societies, political parties aggregate the preferences of both men and women. Yet, because of the asymmetries of variability and solidarity between the sexes, female preferences aggregate more easily than male preferences. They therefore form a relatively unified political pole, structured around the defense of female interests.

If female preferences are realized in a unified pole, opposition to that pole can only be realized through other types of preferences. It therefore necessarily involves a share of masculinity. But, because of greater male variability, these opposition movements do not aggregate into a single party. They instead structure themselves in two ways: through rejection of female preferences, or through the promotion of particular male interests.

It remains to name these poles. The duality of the sexes naturally calls for the duality of “left” and “right.” Moreover, in many languages, the right is associated with rectitude, correctness, or authority. In English, to be right means to be correct. French itself contrasts adroit and gauche, that is, skillfulness and clumsiness. Even in the common imagination, clumsiness often carries a feminine connotation. In Latin too, dexter, the right, gave rise to “dexterity,” while sinister, the left, gave rise to “sinister.” From German to Hungarian, and through Chinese as well, “right” and “left” are respectively associated with masculinity and femininity. Hence the political expressions of female preferences may naturally be called “leftism,” and those of male preferences “rightisms.”

As for the movements usually described as far left (Marxism, Khmer Rouge, radical ecology, radical feminism, or the queer movement) they obey a common mechanism: they rationalize an isolated part of femininity in a radical way. Yet this radical rationalization is a typically masculine behavior. These so-called far-left movements therefore emerge through the masculinization of a feminine intuition. They thus amount to a hybridization between female preference and male preference: neither rightist nor leftist. The LFE even describes them as communisms, in a very precise sense.

Under this interpretation, the relevant political axis no longer runs from the far left to the far right. It instead stretches from communism to anti-leftism, placing ideal leftism at the top of a horseshoe turned toward the left.

IV. Is a predominantly female domain automatically leftist?

No. The leftist nature of a domain is inferred from its alignment with natural female interests and behaviours, rather than from its demographic composition. An activity can therefore be mostly, or even exclusively, practised by women without being leftist.

This is notably the case with prostitution, grid girls, and trade-show hostesses. These activities primarily respond to male preferences because they embody a form of femininity shaped by the male gaze. Conversely, an activity can be mostly practised or consumed by men and still be leftist.

Electric and autonomous vehicles, for example, are still bought disproportionately by men. They nevertheless respond to concerns about safety, comfort, and environmental protection, all of which are more feminine than masculine. Socio-liberal parties and left-wing media are likewise mostly led by men, yet still respond to female preferences. They are therefore leftist in the sense of the LFE.

Even norms imposed on men should converge toward female preferences. In aesthetic norms, for example, the gradual decline of suit-and-tie seems to reflect a female preference for smart or business-casual attire. Likewise, virtually no leftist politicians nowadays wear thick beards, which seems, here too, to reflect a female preference for clean-shaven faces or controlled stubble.

V. Is the LFE just the voting gender gap?

No. It is the opposite: the voting gender gap between the sexes is a direct consequence of the LFE.

More generally, the LFE does not reduce femininity to biological sex alone. First, because no woman embodies the totality of natural female interests and behaviours. Second, because individual variability guarantees that some men are more feminine than some women, and vice versa. The LFE thus predicts that the preferences of leftist men respond more closely to female preferences than those of non-leftist men. Sometimes, even more closely than those of non-leftist women.

The existence of so-called strongly leftist traits illustrates this idea. These are natural female traits adopted more frequently by leftist men than by right-wing women. In survey form, such a trait often follows the pattern:

right-wing men < right-wing women < left-wing men < left-wing women

In that case, political orientation, that is feminine values thanks to the LFE, clearly outweighs biological sex. This is why the LFE fully accepts the distinction between sex and gender. In fact, this makes leftism a form of genderism.

Several American datasets confirm this pattern, using Republican and Democrat identification as an imperfect but useful approximation of rightism and leftism. This is the case, for example, with the belief that women still face significant obstacles to advancement, the principle that the decision to have an abortion should belong solely to the pregnant woman, and support for gun control. Even more amusingly, skepticism toward male-only social spaces is a strongly leftist trait… just like heightened support for their female analogues.

VI. Is the Left-Female Equivalence a circular theory?

Like every equivalence, the LFE can be used circularly if used carelessly. If leftism is identified only from femininity, and femininity only from leftism, the theory loses its explanatory value. To avoid this, the two sides of the equivalence must first be anchored independently, even if only roughly.

On the leftism side, this independent anchor is made possible by the leftward drift: independently of any claim about femininity, rich, free, and safe societies tend to converge toward similar laws, norms, markets, and political trade-offs. This convergence defines a limit-leftism that can be inferred without first invoking female preferences.

On the female side, the independent anchor is the study of female preferences themselves, through polls, market studies, scientific literature, consumption data, occupational choices, and aesthetic preferences. Even ordinary intuition is often enough, provided it is used cautiously.

It is only when these two independently identified sides coincide that the LFE proves correct. Three methods are possible for establishing this correspondence.

1. The first method is by direct verification. In this case, female preferences and political expressions are identified independently of one another. If the two coincide, the LFE is strengthened. If not, one side has to be revised.

   
   For example, women are on average more attracted than men to introspective practices, emotional language and various forms of therapy. Meanwhile, modern societies seem to be evolving precisely in a direction that gives ever greater importance to mental health, feelings, vulnerability and so-called emotional intelligence. To the point of introducing empathy classes in schools.

2. The second method proceeds by deduction, from female preferences to leftism. This is often the most useful direction. When two preferences are clearly ordered on the female side, the LFE predicts that the corresponding political expressions should be ordered in the same way. If women prefer wine to beer, for example, socio-liberal societies should then treat wine more favourably than beer, whether in its public image, in scientific studies, or in the tax code.

   
   The LFE can thus explain, and even uncover, political asymmetries that would otherwise remain unexplained. And if no political translation yet preserves this female order, the LFE becomes predictive. This is precisely what makes the LFE above all a theory of leftism, rather than a theory of femininity.

3. The third method proceeds by induction, from leftism to female preferences. This is the most delicate direction. Indeed, sometimes a political asymmetry is clearer than its corresponding female preference. In such cases, the LFE can reveal a female trait that has not yet been properly measured. But this use does not validate itself. The trait thus inferred must then be confirmed independently, through data, observation, or other evidence.
   

   Socio-liberal societies, for example, tend to treat true crime with more indulgence than first-person shooter games. The female attraction to true crime may therefore not be a mere fashion trend, but the expression of a natural preference.

Each side of the equivalence thus constrains the other, allowing the two to test and correct each other mutually. This is how the LFE avoids becoming a circular and empty theory.

VII. What would weaken the LFE?

The LFE would be weakened if rich, free, and safe societies systematically converged toward laws, markets, and cultural norms that protect incompatible male preferences against female preferences.

It would also be weakened if supposedly leftist political expressions repeatedly failed to correspond to any independently identifiable female preference.

More concretely, the LFE would be severely weakened if socio-liberal societies began to dismantle one of the most important female preferences: the monopoly of pregnancy.

VIII. Do rightisms coincide with anti-leftism?

No. A rightism is the political expression of specific masculine preferences. By contrast, anti-leftism is defined exclusively by its opposition to leftism, independently of any affinity with masculinity. Yet masculine preferences are not always incompatible with natural femininity. Some even align with it perfectly.

This is the case, for example, with subsidizing female contraception. On the one hand, such a subsidy increases women’s control over conception, thereby strengthening the monopoly of pregnancy; on the other hand, it allows men to avoid unwanted fatherhood. Such a measure is therefore both leftist and rightist. The same applies to a right to repair limited to tractors and industrial machinery. By strengthening private property and technical autonomy, this limited right to repair clearly satisfies a masculine preference. Yet the act of repairing also satisfies a feminine desire for preservation and waste reduction. It is therefore not anti-leftist.

Conversely, a political decision can be anti-leftist without being rightist. Leftism, for example, taxes spirits more heavily than beer, and beer more heavily than wine. An anti-leftist inversion of this order would therefore tax wine more heavily than beer, and beer more heavily than spirits. Yet such an inversion would satisfy no masculine preference. It would merely mechanically invert a feminine preference.

More amusingly still, pushing this inversion to the extreme, by subsidizing spirits and beer but not wine, would end up becoming rather rightist. What would make it rightist here, then, is not the radicality of the inversion, but the fact that it would answer a masculine interest for beers and spirits.